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BRIEFING 
Back on Track? Somaliland after its 2017 Presidential Election 
Scott Pegg and Michael Walls* 
On 13 December 2017, Somaliland’s fifth president, Musa Bihi Abdi was inaugurated. Bihi 
ran as candidate for the ruling Kulmiye party after the incumbent president, Ahmed 
Mohamed Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’, decided not to seek re-election. Article Nine of 
Somaliland’s Constitution allows for only three political parties, and Bihi defeated 
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro’ of Waddani party, and Faisal Ali ‘Warabe’ of the For 
Justice and Development (UCID) party. The race was widely expected to be a close contest 
between Kulmiye and Waddani, with UCID playing a minor role. Ultimately, though, Bihi 
secured an outright majority with 55.1 percent (305,909 votes) to Irro’s 40.7 percent (226,092 
votes) and Warabe’s 4.2 percent (23,141 votes). In securing more votes than the other two 
parties combined, Kulmiye’s margin of victory of 79,817 votes exceeded most expectations. 
Domestic and international observers found minor problems with the election but generally 
hailed its peaceful and orderly nature. This briefing reflects on the election and campaign, 
and assesses the key challenges facing the new administration. President Bihi’s daunting ‘to-
do’ list includes determining the future of Somaliland’s iris-based voter registration system, 
enabling badly delayed legislative elections, reevaluating Somaliland’s increasingly 
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dysfunctional hybrid mix of traditional and modern governance, developing potential oil 
reserves and deciding whether to resume talks with Mogadishu. 
 A former British protectorate, Somaliland reasserted its sovereignty by declaring 
independence from Somalia in 1991. Somaliland’s separate colonial status (namely its five 
days of sovereign independence in June 1960 before uniting with the former Italian colony of 
Somalia) coupled with questions over the legality of its union with Somalia and the brutal 
destruction meted out by Siad Barre’s regime in the war to depose him, make it possible for 
Somaliland to present its case as the dissolution of a failed union rather than as secession. 
These factors, accompanied by a commitment to respect colonial borders, give Somaliland a 
uniquely powerful argument for the recognition of its sovereignty.1 A 2005 African Union 
fact-finding mission found that all of this ‘makes Somaliland’s search for recognition 
historically unique and self-justified in African political history’ and held that recognizing 
Somaliland would not open up a ‘Pandora’s box’ of other secessionist claims.2 Yet, although 
peaceful since 1997,3 and having made considerable progress toward economic recovery and 
electoral democracy, 26 years after declaring independence, Somaliland remains a de facto 
state: an entity that controls territory, provides governance, receives popular support, persists 
over time and yet remains unrecognized by other sovereign states.4 
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Democracy in Somaliland 
The 2017 vote was Somaliland’s third direct presidential election (following earlier polls in 
2003 and 2010) and its sixth direct election overall (including local council elections in 2002 
and 2012 and parliamentary elections in 2005).5 International election observers have 
monitored elections and generally found them to be well run and credible with the partial 
exception of the 2012 local council elections when the lack of a voter registry and the ‘ease 
with which indelible ink was removed may have permitted a substantial number of voters to 
cast multiple ballots, potentially reducing the integrity of results’.6 
 Somaliland’s democracy juxtaposes striking successes with recurrent and persistent 
problems. Its biggest success by far is in institutionalizing the regular turnover of its 
presidents. In their work on the institutionalization of political power in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Posner and Young identify five ways in which leaders can leave office, grouped into two 
broad categories: ‘those in which leaders left power through regular means (which include 
natural death, voluntary resignation, or losing an election) and those in which leaders were 
removed by irregular means (coup or violent overthrow or assassination)’.7 Somaliland’s first 
four presidents  – Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ (1991 – 1993, losing an election among 
clan elders), Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (1993 – 2002, natural death), Dahir Riyale Kahin (2002 
– 2010, losing a popular election) and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’ (2010 – 2017, 
voluntary resignation/not seeking reelection) – have all left office through regular means. To 
the extent that the regular turnover of leaders ‘marks the most important step toward 
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restraining executive power and institutionalizing political authority more broadly’,8 
Somaliland is a consolidated democracy. 
 Somaliland’s democracy has also survived several shocks or crises including the 
unexpected death of President Egal in 2002, his replacement by a vice-president from a 
minority clan in accordance with Somaliland’s constitution, an incredibly close 2003 
presidential election with an initial margin of victory of 80 votes whose result the loser 
accepted, two opposition parties winning control of Somaliland’s parliament in 2005, 
repeated delays to a presidential election originally scheduled for 2008 but not held until 
2010 and the implosion of the country’s previous ruling party, the United Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (UDUB), after its defeat in those elections. 
 Somaliland’s innovative ‘hybrid’ mix of traditional, clan-based structures (now 
institutionalized in the Guurti or upper house of parliament) and modern state institutions has 
been widely praised, with Richards going so far as to argue that, for Somaliland, 
‘institutionalized traditional authority is not a sacrifice of acceptable statehood, but rather a 
necessity for acceptable statehood to be achieved in the emerging state’.9 
 Yet, Caspersen’s conclusion that ‘unrecognized states often run out of steam and find 
themselves in a seemingly perpetual transition; they make steps towards democratization but 
reach a plateau fairly early on and may even experience democratic setbacks’ is by no means 
irrelevant to Somaliland.10 As is the case with other Eurasian de facto states like Abkhazia, 
Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria, Somaliland features a presidential system ‘in which the 
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executive eclipses both legislative and judicial arms of government’.11 The great excitement 
initially felt in 2005 when two opposition parties won control of Somaliland’s parliament 
quickly dissipated because ‘When the opposition won… they realized they had nothing’.12  
Somaliland’s regular turnover of its presidents is also tempered by repeated delays to 
its elections. Correctly fearing his own loss of power, President Riyale engineered a series of 
delays that prevented elections, originally scheduled for 2008, from being held until 2010. 
Even though he was in poor health and not seeking reelection, President Silanyo’s preference 
for holding elections as scheduled in 2015 could not prevent them from being delayed until 
2017. The situation is even worse with the legislative branch. Upper house or Guurti 
members ostensibly serve six-year terms but have not been elected or selected since 1997. 
The Guurti’s repeated self-extensions and the tendency to replace deceased members with 
immediate family has greatly undermined public confidence in the institution.13 Presidential 
dominance is exacerbated by the fact that lower house MPs, with a constitutionally-mandated 
term of five years, have not faced election since 2005. 
Somaliland’s previously lauded system of traditional and modern governance is 
increasingly dysfunctional. While most observers credit clan elders and their subsequent 
institutionalization as the upper house of parliament with helping to maintain peace and 
enable Somaliland’s early development, there are increasing fears that ‘the basis for the 
stability necessary to create the state could also be the basis for instability if the relationship 
between the traditional and the modern becomes unbalanced’.14 Ken Menkhaus highlights the 
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negative economic consequences of hybrid or informal governance and argues that ‘evidence 
is mounting that… the country must move toward more robust institutions and formal rule of 
law if it is to attract and regulate new levels of private sector investment’.15 More generally, 
Hoehne argues that the Guurti has now been effectively coopted into the executive and no 
longer serves as a check on presidential power. Somaliland, in his view, finds itself today 
with ‘not only an imbalanced but a ‘crippled’ hybrid order that advances neither effective 
democracy nor strong traditional governance, but undermines both the Western-oriented state 
and the home-grown traditional system’.16 
 
Pre-election delays and voter registration 
The November 2017 presidential election was originally scheduled for June 2015. In March 
2015, Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) requested a nine-month delay, 
principally to complete voter registration. A series of debates and controversies ultimately 
intertwined to extend the NEC’s proposed nine-month delay to nearly 2.5 years. Although 
President Silanyo had announced he was not seeking re-election and wanted to step down, 
Kulmiye party members were divided between those who thought an earlier election gave 
them an advantage over Waddani, which only became a political party after the 2012 local 
council elections, and those who wanted to remain in office for as long as possible. One 
major controversy centered on whether presidential and parliamentary elections should be 
combined or held separately. President Silanyo was a strong proponent of separating them 
and holding presidential elections first while Somaliland’s western supporters argued 
strongly for holding presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously. Concerns that 
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significant population displacement caused by the severe drought in Somaliland’s eastern 
regions would delay voter registration and, later, the distribution of voter cards also featured 
prominently in the rationales advanced for delaying the election.17  
 The NEC’s initial request for a nine-month delay was transformed by the Guurti into 
a controversial two-year extension of President Silanyo’s term until March 2017. Under 
Article 83 of Somaliland’s constitution, the Guurti can extend the president’s term if 
elections cannot be held ‘because of security considerations’, but it was not clear that those 
conditions existed. In January 2017, two months before the scheduled March 2017 elections, 
the three political parties agreed to delay the election for a further six months due to the 
ongoing drought in the east which complicated voter card distribution. The Guurti added two 
more months to this agreement and mandated a separate and distinct process for 
parliamentary elections. Ultimately, the NEC established 13 November 2017 as the new date 
for the presidential elections. Lower house parliamentary elections are now scheduled for 29 
April 2019.18 
Somaliland’s initial attempt to develop a secure voter register before the 2010 
presidential elections was mired in controversy. Although the resultant register was employed 
in those elections, it ‘was by then so tainted by errors and problems that it was abandoned not 
long afterwards’.19 The lack of a voter registry and the ease by which indelible ink was 
removed meant that ‘successful attempts at multiple voting occurred at very significant 
levels’ during the 2012 local elections.20 To address these problems, Somaliland adopted sub-
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Saharan Africa’s first iris-based biometric voter registration system. Field tests were 
conducted in 2014 and voter registration ran from January – September 2016 in 21 of the 23 
districts across Somaliland’s six regions. International observers found a generally advanced 
level of understanding of the process, a high proportion of voters who were able to get clean 
iris scans on both eyes and an average start-to-finish completion time of ten minutes for the 
registration process.21 873,331 voters successfully completed registration. That number 
surprised some, who had expected more, perhaps because the widely discredited 2009 voter 
register included, in its final form, 1,069,914 registered voters.22 
The distribution of voter cards started in shifts in April 2017 in the Awdal and Saahil 
regions and concluded in September 2017 in Sool and Sanaag. Ultimately, 704,089 voters 
collected their cards, with the collection rate ranging from 69.76 percent in Awdal to 94.26 
percent in Sanaag, and a national average of 80.62 percent.23 The 169,242 registrants who did 
not collect their cards were ineligible to vote. 
There is widespread agreement that the iris-based biometric voter registration worked 
well and was generally embraced by Somaliland’s electorate. The fact that voters had to vote 
in a specific polling station and that officials had printouts of each voter’s registration card 
and could thus match card numbers and faces, dramatically reduced the problem of multiple 
voting seen in 2012. 
There are, however, several concerns with the voter registration system. First, all 
873,331 voters registered more than one year before the actual poll, and some registered 
almost two years in advance of election day, yet there were no provisions for late registration 
or for replacement of lost or stolen cards. Also, while the iris-based biometric registration 
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system is extremely good at preventing multiple registrations, it cannot verify age so, in the 
absence of a national birth registry, underage voters can still register if an accredited clan 
elder (caaquil) vouches for them. International observers saw many examples of voters who 
appeared to be under Somaliland’s voting age of 16. This is not a fault of the iris-based 
system, but it illustrates some of the limits to it. Finally, there are no plans yet for updating 
the system to ensure newly eligible voters or those who missed out in 2017 can be included. 
 
Election campaign: Historic debate, heated rhetoric, limited policy focus 
Although the official campaign did not start until 21 October 2017, it was preceded two days 
earlier by a historic milestone when all three presidential candidates gathered at the Maan 
Soor Hotel in Hargeisa for Somaliland’s first-ever televised presidential debate. In fact, the 
debate was only the seventh presidential debate anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960, 
and was shown live on Facebook and on nine Somali-language television channels. It 
attracted an estimated 8-9,000,000 viewers across the Horn of Africa. Remarkably, the debate 
was organized by a handful of Somaliland youth, most in their 20s, and members of the non-
governmental organization, the Inspire Group. The success of the event has created a 
widespread expectation that all subsequent presidential elections in Somaliland will feature 
similar debates. The steady performance of Musa Bihi Abdi, who was not previously viewed 
as a natural politician, was widely seen as boosting his campaign, although many considered 
the UCID leader, ‘Warabe’, the clear winner. 
 Somaliland’s official campaign season ran for 21 days from 21 October – 10 
November with each party allocated seven days for exclusive campaigning on rotation. The 
designation of separate campaign days for each party is intended to minimize the potential for 
clashes between rival supporters. While this approach largely worked as intended, things 
nevertheless became heated, particularly in the second week. Social media played a 
dramatically larger role than previously. In many ways, this was a positive development, with 
#SomalilandDebates and #SomalilandVotes serving as valuable conduits of information and 
individual Somalilanders like Rooble Mohamed, whose @Rooble2009 Twitter account has 
more than 16,000 followers, performing a similar role. Yet Somaliland also saw a semi-
epidemic of fake news, including assorted rumors that key party officials were negotiating to 
desert one major party for the other, and ad hominem character attacks on party officials or 
ministers. 
The candidates’ own rhetoric also became heated at times, with ‘Warabe’ 
(presumably metaphorically) suggesting that anyone who traveled to Somalia should be put 
to death. Causing far more controversy, Bihi accused Waddani candidate ‘Irro’ of being a 
closet Somali unionist, with ‘Irro’ hitting back with the accusation that Bihi is a war criminal. 
‘Irro’ also had his house vandalized. Fortunately, in typical Somaliland fashion, things 
calmed down dramatically in the third week of the campaign after various formal and 
informal interventions by respected individuals, aided by President Silanyo’s forceful 
condemnation of the attack on Irro’s house. One novel development was the decision by 
political parties to devote some of their campaign time to charity events, helping poor or 
disabled citizens. These interventions dramatically reduced tensions and helped put 
Somaliland back on track for a peaceful election. 
One disappointing aspect of the campaign was how little attention was devoted to 
policy. Supporters of each major party were quick to emphasize the passion behind their 
disagreements, but struggled when asked to elaborate on specific issues or policies on which 
they differed. In some ways, UCID, with its argument for more state intervention in the 
economy and its promise to devote 15 percent of the government’s budget to health care 
boasted a clearer policy platform than either of the others. Perhaps the sharpest difference 
between Kulmiye and Waddani centered around the government’s deals with DP World24 to 
renovate Berbera’s port and with the United Arab Emirates to establish a military base in 
Berbera. Kulmiye’s campaign promised continuity, while Waddani’s campaign emphasized 
the deals’ problems and promised to renegotiate both. 
 
The election and its immediate aftermath: Peaceful poll but difficult post-vote period 
Somaliland had 1,642 polling stations operating for election day. Typically, polling stations 
were staffed by four NEC employees, often university students, who were deployed outside 
their home regions to minimize the potential for clan connections to compromise impartiality. 
In the urban centers, it was not unusual to find polling stations staffed entirely by women. In 
the rural areas, all-male polling staff was the norm. In addition to officials, most polling 
stations had observers present from the three political parties. In most cases, the International 
Election Observation Mission witnessed these ‘party agents’ working collaboratively and 
amicably. The Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SONSAF) deployed 620 domestic 
observers, each remaining in one polling station all day and collectively covering about 38 
percent of all polling stations. The International Election Observation Mission deployed 60 
observers from 27 different countries in 30 teams of two persons each across all six of 
Somaliland’s regions. On average, international observers spent 20-30 minutes at each 
polling station and covered about 350 polling stations or just over 21 percent of the total. 
Somaliland police officers were deployed outside all polling stations but were not supposed 
to enter them. In most cases, they maintained a discreet and professional presence and did not 
interfere with the conduct of the election. 
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 By almost all accounts, the election was peaceful, festive and orderly.25 Hundreds of 
voters were queued outside polling stations hours before they opened at 7:00 AM. In total, 
555,142 voters cast ballots, a turnout of 78.85 percent of those who picked up their 
registration cards and 63.57 percent of all those who registered to vote. Domestic and 
international observers noted minor irregularities in places but nothing that affected the 
overall integrity of the election. In addition to the concern about potentially underage voters, 
probably the most consistent departure from international electoral norms concerned the 
secrecy of the ballot. Many Somalilanders do not feel a need to keep their preferences secret 
and disabled or illiterate voters would often enter a polling station and loudly proclaim the 
party for which they wished to vote, requesting assistance to do so. In some polling stations, 
officials would try to explain how to vote for that party, while asking the voter to mark the 
ballot themselves. In other polling stations, officials would mark the ballot for the voter in 
accordance with his or her wish. In all such cases, the ballot would be shown to any 
domestic, international or political party observers present so they could see that the voter’s 
clearly expressed preference was honored. While the secrecy of the ballot was not 
maintained, voters’ wishes were respected. This is more a reflection of the openness of 
Somaliland culture or society than it is a malign violation of international norms.26 
 At about 4:00 PM on the day of the election, Somaliland’s government blocked all 
access to social media sites including Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. This controversial 
ban was justified as a measure to prevent the circulation of unsubstantiated accusations of 
fraud and unfounded rumors as to the victor and remained in place until 17 November. 
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Whatever one’s views on this temporary ban, it did not prevent election rumors from 
circulating or preserve the peaceful atmosphere seen on election day. After Waddani officials 
alleged electoral irregularities in Berbera and Gabiley, demonstrations erupted in Burao and 
Hargeisa on 16 November, leaving three people dead and nine injured.27 Calm was quickly 
restored after interventions by President Silanyo and Waddani’s Irro, but the violence seemed 
utterly unnecessary after the peaceful and orderly conduct of the election. Waddani repeated 
allegations of fraud, vote rigging, fake ballot papers and other irregularities and ceased 
cooperation with the NEC a few days after the election, but ultimately, Irro conceded defeat 
because he did not want his ‘desire to hold this post [to] destroy my country and shed my 
people’s blood’. However, he still maintained that there were ‘irregularities’ and that the 
NEC had ‘declared false results’.28 
 
Future challenges: Legislative elections, oil and port development, international status 
When asked what he would view as an early mark of success for the new government, 
Somaliland’s former finance minister and former foreign minister Abdillahi Duale (who 
campaigned for Musa Bihi Abdi in this election) immediately replied that he would look for 
the appointment of a smaller and leaner cabinet of 12-15 ministers, all of whom were selected 
based on their competence rather than their clan affiliation.29 President-elect Bihi similarly 
promised a smaller cabinet of 15 ministers.30 This was largely in response to a widespread 
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feeling that the Silanyo Administration’s cabinet had become unwieldy and bloated. 
Ultimately, Bihi appointed 23 ministers and six deputy or assistant ministers. This arguably 
represents some progress but not as much as many Somalilanders hoped for. 
 The Bihi administration, in tandem with the NEC, faces three immediate electoral 
challenges. Decisions must be made soon about how the iris-based biometric voter 
registration system will be updated in the future to account for new voters coming of age and 
existing voters who have relocated or lost or failed to retrieve voter cards. The new 
administration must also identify a viable method for selecting or electing members of the 
Guurti or upper house of parliament. Guurti members who, under Article 58 of Somaliland’s 
constitution, are supposed to serve six-year terms have not been elected or selected since 
1997 and it is difficult to see how the dissatisfaction so vocally expressed with Somaliland’s 
‘hybrid’ mix of traditional and modern governance can be addressed in the absence of a 
regular and agreed method for Guurti membership election or selection. Unfortunately, as 
Jama notes, it is not an ‘exaggeration to argue that almost all the members of the Guurti are 
against any change in their seats. Currently, they are enjoying indefinite and life time term’.31 
Finally, the new administration desperately needs to keep lower house parliamentary 
elections, now scheduled for April 2019, on track.32 If these elections are held on time, 
members of parliament will have served nine years beyond their constitutionally-mandated 
five-year terms. The sensitive issue here is agreeing upon a formula for reallocating 
parliamentary seats based on population changes. While the best option would be a national 
census, this would be both costly and controversial. Alternatively, Somaliland could decide to 
maintain the 2005 formula (which was based on population estimates in 1960) or it could 
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come up with some other negotiated compromise.33 Somaliland’s political system will remain 
tilted toward the executive branch but each of the houses of parliament would be better able 
to serve as a check on executive dominance if their members were seen to have similarly 
legitimate mandates as the president. 
 Economically, Somaliland’s new administration faces two major challenges and two 
potentially transformative opportunities. The first major challenge concerns Somaliland’s 
dependence on remittances from its diaspora. There are no official figures on remittance 
volumes, but estimates range from US$500-900 million per year, equivalent to 35-70 percent 
of Somaliland’s gross domestic product (GDP). This makes Somaliland one of the world’s 
most remittance-dependent economies.34 Questions abound as to how sustainable these flows 
are, particularly given that many of the people who left Somaliland in the 1980s or 1990s are 
now advanced in age. Somaliland’s second major challenge is its heavy dependence on 
livestock exports in a drought-prone region where the adverse effects of global climate 
change are clearly visible. Nearly half the population depends entirely on livestock 
production for its livelihood and livestock production accounts for almost 30 percent of 
Somaliland’s GDP and is its single largest export.35 As the World Bank notes, ‘The sector’s 
heavy dependence on the Saudi market for 80 percent of its exports reduces its options and 
bargaining positions’.36 Saudi Arabia imposed livestock export bans on Somaliland in 1998, 
in 2000 and again in 2016 and this ban remains in effect, although a limited and specific 
exception was made for the Hajj. 
 Somaliland’s first potentially transformative opportunity concerns the redevelopment 
of the Berbera port and the larger Berbera-Hargeisa-Wajaale economic corridor. Ethiopia’s 
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growing imports and its desire to have other options besides Djibouti offer significant 
potential upside for Somaliland. The success with which the Berbera port deal with DP 
World is implemented will greatly affect Somaliland’s economic prospects. The second 
major opportunity or threat for Somaliland is oil production. Genel has recently completed 
extensive 2D seismic surveys and production could begin as early as 2019 or 2020.37 Oil 
could potentially generate hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues for Somaliland that 
could be used to build desperately needed infrastructure and alleviate poverty but, to date, 
Somaliland has done little to prepare legislatively or institutionally for the arrival of oil and a 
resource curse with or without commercially viable oil reserves remains a distinct 
possibility.38 This question will likely be answered during the Bihi Administration’s first few 
years in office. 
 Finally, on the international front, Somaliland remains committed to seeking 
widespread international recognition of its proclaimed sovereignty but has made no progress 
in this regard. The Bihi Administration has an opportunity to direct more of its focus toward 
expanding Somaliland’s ‘engagement without recognition’ with willing partners like 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, the UAE, the US and the UK.39 The other major international issue soon 
to confront the new administration will be whether and how to re-engage in talks with 
Somalia. There is widespread dissatisfaction in Somaliland with Turkey’s role as a mediator 
in the previous talks and it is difficult to see the talks getting anywhere without new 
mediators. Somaliland will probably feel some pressure to seem cooperative, but it has 
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gained little from earlier talks and will enter new ones with limited hopes for any substantive 
progress. 
 Somaliland deserves praise for its peaceful and successful presidential election. It has 
certainly suffered in recent years from having an aging president in declining health and will 
benefit from the fresh start of a new administration. The Bihi administration has been 
cautious since the inauguration in adopting a careful approach to assembling a cabinet and 
starting the new term, but they face considerable challenges if Somaliland is to be placed 
firmly on track to build on past progress. 
